November the 9th, 2026 – Will the new dawn in Serbia after the removal of Aleksandar Vučić finally result in a long-awaited change of relations with Croatia?
The fact that a new group of people with fresh policies will finally lead Serbia does not necessarily mean that it will totally abandon its old, poisonous national priorities. Zlatko Crncec reports for Novi list that the new political ruling elite in Serbia is encouragingly announcing a radical break with the foreign policy of Aleksandar Vučić. However, as in everything else, much, if not almost everything, remains rather unclear.
Both when it comes to who will make up the future Serbian Government, and what exact policy they will pursue. Because the fact that a new team is coming to the head of Serbia does not necessarily mean that it could abandon old national priorities. Between good-neighbourly relations, the protection of Serbs in the region, the constitutional issue of Kosovo and the attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, space opens up for serious political uncertainties.
It is still not clear whether the victory of the Student List “Students are Winning” also means a real change in Serbia’s attitude towards neighbouring countries. Or will only the way in which the previous national and foreign policy goals are presented to the public change?
neighbourly relations…
This is especially important for Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo. These are the countries towards which Aleksandar Vučić’s policy, in various forms and intensities, has for years been burdened by unresolved issues from the past, national pretensions, the instrumentalisation of the position of Serbian communities and occasional political crises. The programme of the list and the public appearances of its leader Ilija Srdanović point to several important conclusions. First, the new political structure wants to distance itself from the personalised foreign policy of Aleksandar Vučić. Second, it does not intend to abandon traditional Serbian state priorities, especially when it comes to Republika Srpska and Kosovo. Third, it is trying to find a language that would simultaneously satisfy pro-European oriented citizens, the nationally sensitive part of the electorate and international partners. Precisely in that combination lies the greatest unknown of the new policy.
For Croatia the most important message is the one that the leader of the Student List Ilija Srdanović expressed immediately after the election victory. He announced that relations between the two countries will be based on good-neighbourliness, and not on a policy of confrontation. “Croatia will not be in any other status there except good-neighbourly relations,” Srdanović emphasised. In doing so he attributed responsibility for the deterioration of relations to the previous Serbian president. He spoke about the policy of one man who “set two peoples against each other”, emphasising that foreign policy should in the future be conducted by the government of Serbia, and not by an individual. Namely, in Serbia the government has greater powers than the president, but it is allowed that he can be a member of a party.
Vučić, at least for the largest part of his mandate, was also the president of the ruling SNS and in that way was able through party discipline to be at the same time the strongest political figure in Serbia. Therefore what Srdanović stated can still mean some progress. Vučić’s Serbia often used the Croatian state as a foreign policy opponent, and Croatian authorities as a convenient argument in domestic political showdowns.
Accusations about Croatian influence on the Serbian opposition, alleged interference in internal affairs and acting against Serbian national interests were part of everyday political life. Srdanović’s message suggests that such a practice could be abandoned. However, it is important to pay attention to his statement about Croatia, and for now much clearer regarding mere political tone than when it comes to concrete moves. Besides, at this moment it is still not clear whether Srdanović, although he was first on the list, will even be a member of the new Serbian Government. If he will be, it isn’t clear which portfolio he could take over.
minority rights
The more extensive Student List programme shows that a good-neighbourly policy does not mean abandoning issues that have traditionally burdened relations between Belgrade and Zagreb. In the part of the programme that relates to the position of Serbs in the region, the list particularly emphasises the rights of Serbs in Croatia, the preservation of their national, cultural and linguistic identity, the position of returnees, what it calls the selective application of law in certain court proceedings, and the conditions for the dignified marking of grave sites.
In doing so it invokes United Nations Security Council Resolution 1120, the Erdut Agreement and the bilateral agreement from 2004 on the protection of the rights of the Croatian minority in Serbia, and of the Serbian and Montenegrin minorities in Croatia. That part of the programme deserves a certain amount of attention. It shows that the Student List does not intend to abandon an active policy of protecting the Serbian minority outside the borders of Serbia. That in itself, of course, is not at all disputable. The protection of minority rights is a legitimate obligation of every democratic state, and Serbia and Croatia have bilateral agreements precisely so that those rights would be protected. However, a problem arises if minority issues are turned into an instrument of political pressure on a neighbouring state. Which Vučić abundantly used. Therefore for Croatia it will be important how Belgrade will concretise its demands.
Will it be a matter of institutional cooperation, exchange of information, solving the problems of returnees, protection of cultural heritage and equal treatment by judicial bodies, or will space again be opened for political accusations and unilateral interpretations of history? Particularly interesting is that the programme at the same time mentions the rights of the Croatian minority in Serbia. Which are far from what the Serbian minority has in Croatia.
However many shortcomings the model of electing three Serbian deputies in a special electoral unit has, the fact that Croatia nevertheless applies it speaks of the fact that it wants transparent and good relations. On the other hand, in Serbia there is no mechanism that would guarantee that Croats have their guaranteed representative in the National Assembly. The announcement that the Student List could work on that gives the possibility for a different and better model of mutual relations, instead of constant political competition around the position of Serbs in Croatia. If Belgrade is going to advocate for the rights of Serbs in Croatia, it should at the same time show readiness to protect the rights of Croats in Serbia without political calculations, including their cultural autonomy, representation and the possibility of participating in public life.
war crimes
The second major issue remains the wartime past and open questions from the 1990s. Srdanović has in previous appearances emphasised that the new generation does not want to be burdened by responsibility for events from a time in which its members did not participate. Such a position is politically understandable, but it is not sufficient for things to move from a standstill. In that sense more important than statements about a new beginning will be whether the new authorities will open space for a more serious attitude towards the missing, war crimes, archival material and compensation for victims. In the political confusion that currently reigns in Serbia, it is impossible to extract anything more than these genuinely encouraging wishes that Srdanović expressed in the above-mentioned and in several other public appearances.
the attitude towards srebrenica…
Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps the politically most sensitive issue in the entire regional agenda of the Student List. In an interview for Radio Free Europe Srdanović very clearly said that the new authorities will continue cooperation with Republika Srpska. “The continuation of cooperation with Republika Srpska is in the interest of the citizens of Serbia and the citizens of Republika Srpska,” Srdanović said.
To the question of whether Belgrade will encourage the authorities of Republika Srpska to solve problems with the institutions of the central government in Sarajevo, he answered that they will advocate for open dialogue and finding common solutions for all citizens of BiH and Republika Srpska.
Whatever that means.
The Student List does not question the special relationship of Serbia and Republika Srpska. It does not announce its reduction, redefinition or the withdrawal of Belgrade from political and institutional relations with Banja Luka. Another possibility is a change in the way that relationship is realised. Srdanović speaks of dialogue, common solutions and the interests of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which can be read as a distancing from the policy of constant conflicts between Republika Srpska and the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the programme does not give a precise answer to the question of how the Student List imagines the relationship of Belgrade towards the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia has special ties with Republika Srpska, which also stems from its constitutional and political framework, but at the same time has the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The new authorities will have to show whether they can reconcile those two facts without creating additional tensions. Particularly indicative is Srdanović’s answer about Srebrenica. To the question of what position the new authorities will take, he said that the issue of Srebrenica is defined by court decisions, and he mentioned the documents that the Serbian Assembly adopted back in 2010.
